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Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically
supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philoso-
phy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is at the very least understandable—
because conspiracies occur—and that if we take an evidential approach, judging
individual conspiracy theories on their particular merits, belief in such theories
turns out to be warranted in a range of cases.
Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated
with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with
conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in
support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy
theorist’s use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the
conspiracy theorist’s use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever
we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case
for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence.
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1 Introduction
There is, it is fair to say, a stigma against conspiracy theories in popular discourse.
After all, there are an awful lot of theories about putative conspiracies and many of
them—at least some of us think—are poorly evidenced.
Yet a conspiracy theory—if we break down the term into its constituent parts—
is just a theory about a conspiracy; to wit, a theory about two or more people work-
ing together in secret towards some end. This general, non-pejorative deﬁnition has
been defended by philosophers like Brian L. Keeley (Keeley 1999), Charles Pigden
(C. R. Pigden in press), David Coady (Coady 2012), Lee Basham (Basham in press)
and myself (Dentith 2014). Indeed, philosophers interested in the topic of belief
in conspiracy theories (with few exceptions) have argued that you cannot princi-
pally assess conspiracy theories as a class but, rather, we must undertake such an
analysis on a case-by-case basis. The prima facie suspicion of conspiracy theories
generally, before assessing the particulars of individual theories, gets things back-to-
front. Conspiracy theories—like any theory—should be assessed on their evidential
merits.
As will be argued in this article, the kinds of evidence conspiracy theorists appeal
to when proposing or defending their conspiracy theories are not that problematic
when considered properly. If there is an issue with the evidence used in support of
conspiracy theories, then it is an issue of principle: the evidence is being abused or
just not being used appropriately. As such, this paper is both a survey of arguments
in the philosophical literature concerning the way evidence is used to support belief
in conspiracy theories, as well as a synthesis of those arguments. As we will see,
there is no prima facie justiﬁcation for a suspicion of the kinds of evidence conspiracy
theorists are alleged to rely upon.
To show this we will examine the kinds of supposedly problematic evidence and
evidential practices associated with conspiracy theories: from evidence manipula-
tion and selection (section 2); errant data (section 3); claims of disinformation (sec-
tion 4); how our judgements of prior probability inform our estimates about the
existence of conspiracies now (section 4); to the role of secret evidence (section 5).
We will see that the evidentiary principles of the conspiracy theorist are not prob-
lematic in the way some have tried to argue.
In the latter part of the paper we will examine some meta-evidential concerns,
such as worries about the purported size of conspiracies (section 7) and information
hierarchies (section 8), before concluding that—if we are suspicious of some con-
spiracy theory—we have to grapple with interesting evidential concerns before we
can condemn belief in such a theory just because it has been labelled ‘conspiratorial.’
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1.1 Conspiracy theorists
When discussing conspiracy theories, it is hard to get around the discussion of ‘con-
spiracy theorists,’ which is typically taken to be a pejorative label. Now, as Charles
Pigden argues, if we accept the claims of historical sources and contemporary media
coverage, then we know conspiracies occur, and thus we are conspiracy theorists.
If, however, we think those same sources are pure disinformation, then we believe
in the existence of some conspiracy to cover up what is really happening, which in
turn means we subscribe to some conspiracy theory. So, no matter what we believe
about conspiracies, we are conspiracy theorists (C. R. Pigden in press).
Following that argument, whilst we are all conspiracy theorists, we are only con-
spiracy theorists with respect to particular conspiracy theories. That is, if we are
historically or politically literate we are all conspiracy theorists, but we are not con-
spiracy theorists with respect to all conspiracy theories. As such, in this paper ‘con-
spiracy theorist’ will simply refer to someone who holds a particular conspiracy the-
ory. That is, the label is relativised to some theory, rather than being a general
appellation of pejorative character.
2 Evidence Selection&Manipulation
People worry about the way in which conspiracy theorists present evidence for their
conspiracy theories. When assessing the strength of any argument—particularly on
a topic we are not well-informed about—we often worry we have not have been pre-
sented with everything that we need to know. For example, I might claim the reason
I endorsed a candidate for a tenure-track position was because I believed they were
the most suitably qualiﬁed, leaving out the fact that they offered me a substantial
bribe to endorse them. This is an example of what we might term ‘selectiveness.’
Selectiveness: The presentation of carefully selected propositions from a wider
pool of evidence to make a candidate explanation look warranted when it oth-
erwise might not be.
Take, for example, the various 9/11 Inside Job hypotheses, which claim the Septem-
ber 11th, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were committed by el-
ements in the U.S. government. Conspiracy theorists of this ilk are often charac-
terised as being selective in their use of evidence because:
a) their evidence is comprised of selected parts of the total evidence, and
b) by only citing a subset of that evidence, they erroneously conclude that the evi-
dence strongly suggests 9/11 was an inside job.
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There are two kinds of alleged selectiveness on the part of the conspiracy the-
orist here. The ﬁrst is the selection of snippets of the total evidence. The second
follows from the ﬁrst: the framing of this evidential subset as strongly suggesting a
particular conclusion.
Quassim Cassam—using the example of a ﬁctional conspiracy theorist, Oliver—
puts this second kind of selectiveness down to the epistemic vice of gullibility on
the part of conspiracy theorists generally.1 Oliver is said to be selective with his evi-
dence: he insists that 9/11 ‘had to be an inside job …because aircraft impacts couldn’t
have brought down the towers (Cassam 2015),’ and he ‘ignores important evidence
which bears on his questions, relies on unreliable sources, jumps to conclusions and
generally can’t see the wood for the trees (Cassam 2016, p. 164).’
Yet selectiveness is a feature of almost any explanation because it is an activity
associated with the presentation of evidence in explanations generally. As such, the
worry about the selective use of evidence with respect to conspiracy theories must
centre on the question of whether the subset of evidence was manipulated to sug-
gest a conclusion that might not follow should we have access to the total evidence.
That is, if there really is a problem with the selective use of evidence in conspir-
acy theories, then either conspiracy theorists are somehow overly prone to being
selective, or the kind of selective evidence use we see in association with conspiracy
theories is of a problematic kind.
Cassam would have us believe that conspiracy theorists are prone to being prob-
lematically selective in their evidence use because they are gullible. But note that
Cassam’s conspiracy theorist, Oliver, is not a real person; it is telling that Cassam has
to create a conspiracy theorist out of whole cloth to show up the faults of conspiracy
theorists generally, rather than work with an example from real life. After all, no
matter our opinion about the plausibility of the various Inside Job hypotheses, even
the most cursory examination of them provides us with examples of conspiracy the-
orists citing interesting pieces of evidence (many of which appear to be contrary to
the official theory of the event, a topic we will return to in section 3). So, even if we
are to take Cassam’s portrayal of Oliver seriously, then while Oliver may well indeed
suffer from the epistemic vice of gullibility, it is not connected to him being a typical
conspiracy theorist. People like Oliver may well exist in the Inside Job community,
but Oliver—it is fair to say—is someone who is gullible who also just happens to be a
conspiracy theorist about 9/11.2
Indeed, if we are worried about conspiracy theorists selectively presenting their
evidence, then we should also be worried about non-conspiracy theorists doing the
same. Historians, for example, selectively cite evidence from the historical record,
1Whilst Cassam seems willing to admit that conspiracies occur (see (Warburton and Cassam
2015)), he uses the terms ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theory’ in the pejorative sense in the
works discussed here.
2For another analysis of Cassam’s work, see (C. R. Pigden 2016).
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but they do this because:
a) citing all the available evidence would clutter their narrative, and
b) only some of the available evidence is salient.
It is the second point which underscores the idea that selectivity of evidence can
be principled; for the Marxist historian the principle is something about the role
of historical materialism in history; whilst for the advocate of the ‘Great Individuals
of History’ thesis, the principle is something about individuals rising up above the
masses. We see this in other domains: scientists select which pieces of evidence they
take it are salient when engaging in research, ruling out data points which are unre-
lated to the phenomena being explored; social psychologists select which p-values
are salient to their models; and so on. In each of these cases, there is a principle
involved which explains not just why the evidence has been selected, but also what
counts as evidence. That is, the theoretical underpinnings of our inquiries informs
our judgements about what even counts as salient evidence in these cases.
So, is the principle of selection by the conspiracy theorist pathological or ill-
deﬁned? Well, a cursory glance at recent history presents us with a plethora of ac-
tual conspiratorial activity on the part of inﬂuential institutions. Now, if we assume
conspiratorial activity is rare, then the principle behind the conspiracy theorist’s
selective citation of evidence would appear unmotivated. If we assume conspira-
cies are common—or just more common than not—then it seems reasonable for
the conspiracy theorist to suspect and thus include conspiratorial hypotheses in the
pool of potential best explanations for certain kinds of events (we will return to this
issue in section 4.2). So, while we might be able to ﬁnd reasons to call the principle
of evidence selection by certain conspiracy theorists into question, the fact the se-
lectiveness can be principled goes a long way to showing that its adherents are not
acting irrationally.
Indeed, what makes the various 9/11 Inside Job hypotheses interesting is that
under the general deﬁnition of what counts as a conspiracy theory offered earlier,
any explanation of 9/11 turns out to be a conspiracy theory, whether or not you think
the attacks were orchestrated by Al-Qaeda, or the U.S. The event was, after all,
the result of secretive activity undertaken by a group, and that makes any theory
about it a theory about a conspiracy (to wit, a conspiracy theory). As such, Cassam’s
Oliver can be easily contrasted with a story about Oliver’s opposite—say, Olivia—
who could be seen as being just as gullible when it comes to the official (conspiracy)
theory of 9/11. After all, belief in the official theory of 9/11 also relies upon the
selection of evidence; in this case the evidence which purports to show Al-Qaeda
was responsible. Yet people like Cassam are not likely to claim Olivia suffers from
the epistemic vice of gullibility just because she selectively cites evidence in favour of
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her particular conspiratorial hypothesis. Why? Because ultimately Cassam’s analysis
rests upon the assumption belief in conspiracy theories is prima facie irrational, and
so the evidential practices of conspiracy theorists must necessarily be suspect. That
is, Cassam deﬁnes out-of-court the idea conspiracy theorists can be principled in
their use of evidence merely because he has built into his argument that belief in
conspiracy theories is generally irrational.3
What seems to motivate our worry about the conspiracy theorist’s use of se-
lective evidence is our belief that conspiracies are unlikely or irrational to believe.
That is to say, we judge the evidential merit of conspiracy theories on the principle
that evidence for such theories must be hard to come by. Thus, the apparent and
compelling evidence for a particular conspiracy theory must be the product of some
kind of misrepresentation.
2.1 Checks and balances
Given that selectiveness is a feature of the presentation of any explanation, what
can we do to prevent or ameliorate problematic instances of evidence selection gen-
erally? Well, we might be tempted to think there is a sufficient check against cases
of problematic selectiveness (at least in contemporaryWestern democracies) because
we can go and inspect the pool of evidence for ourselves. That is, we do not have
to take anyone’s word that they have, in fact, presented all the salient evidence; if
the evidence is part of the public record, then people (particularly those in positions
of authority) should be less likely to be selective in their presentation of evidence
because they could (and would, most of us hope) be caught.
However, this is only going to be a check against selectiveness if the consequences of
being found out has repercussions. If we live in a society where such behaviour is hushed
up, or even ignored, then public scrutiny might just lead to an increasing mistrust of
certain kinds of authorities, thus raising fears about the likelihood of conspiracies
occurring here-and-now.4 After all, the CIA Inspector General’s Office really did
delete their only copy of 6,700 page report on the CIA’s ‘enhanced interrogation’
programme (Gale 2016). Whilst they claimed the deletion of this presumably damn-
ing report was a mere clerical error, the worry at the time (May 2016) was that the
CIA were selectively removing publicly available evidence which would have shone
a worrying light on the epistemic and moral failures of their ‘enhanced interroga-
tion’ (AKA torture) programme.5 The repercussions of this accidental deletion? A
3For further criticism of Cassam’s argument see (Dentith in press).
4This issue will be addressed in more depth come section 8.
5There is a common species of selective evidence in detective ﬁction: evidence so easily obtained
it becomes obvious something has been removed/deleted/redacted in order to avoid awkward ques-
tions. Arguably this kind of evidence manipulation was central to the rationale as to the necessity
of the invasion of Iraq in 2003; evidence of those pesky weapons of mass destruction was so easily
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slap on the wrist.
These concerns about the members of inﬂuential institutions acting selectively
with respect to evidence cannot be easily pushed to one side; the conspiracy the-
orist’s selective citation of evidence can be as principled as that of anyone else.6
Whilst we can charge conspiracy theorists of sometimes erroneously and selectively
citing evidence in favour of their theories, we cannot claim this is a vice peculiar to
them.
3 ErrantData
Sometimes conspiracy theorists are faulted for their reliance on evidence which is
errant to some rival (often taken to be ‘official’) theory.7 Brian L. Keeley speciates
out two kinds of errant data:
Errant-unaccounted-for data: Data which supports one explanatory hypothe-
sis but is unaccounted for (is not mentioned or explained) by some rival.
and:
Errant-contradictory data: Data cited in favour of one explanatory hypothesis
which contradicts another, rival hypothesis (Keeley 1999).
Now, some data in the total pool of evidence will always be errant to a particu-
lar explanation; this is the principle of explanatory fuzziness. Explanations are—at
least with respect to topics like history and the social sciences—fuzzy around the
edges.8. Indeed, in most cases theories which are rivals to one another (conspiracy
or otherwise) will cite some data which is errant to each other.9 So, the citation of
errant-contrary data is no ‘mark of the incredible’ (to quote Keeley (Keeley 2007, p.
137)); we cannot dismiss a conspiracy theory merely because of the citation of data
which supports one theory but is unaccounted for by some other.
However, the citation of contradictory data might be a problem. Normally, if we
discover evidence which contradicts a particular explanatory hypothesis, then that
is reason enough to reject it.
found, yet when investigated the evidence had the hallmarks of having been curated/manipulated.
6The obvious retort here would be to ﬁnd examples of unprincipled citation of evidence by con-
spiracy theorists. However, we will ﬁnd similar examples in the seemingly non-conspiratorial works
of historians, scientists and politicians. Indeed, the existence of these examples are often fodder for
the conspiracy theorist and her theory.
7For an analysis of the arguments as to whether conspiracy theories are in some sense unofficial,
and thus rival to official theories, see (Dentith 2014, ch. 7) and (Dentith 2016).
8The corollary of this is that explanations in these domains which are not fuzzy—and thus take
into account all the evidence—are likely post facto in nature
9A point pressed by (Coady 2006).
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Take, for example, the death of Kim JongNam—half-brother to the leader of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—who died fromVX nerve poison.
This piece of evidence contradicted the official theory promulgated by the govern-
ment of the DPRK, who not only claimedKim JongNam died of natural causes—to
wit, a heart attack—but that reports which said otherwise were the product of a con-
spiracy against the DPRK.
Such errant-contradictory data, though, is not a feature unique to conspiracy the-
ories; it is also cited (or omitted) with respect to theories deemed non-conspiratorial.
For example, the story told by the U.K. and the U.S. about the Iraqi regime contin-
uing their weapon of mass destruction programme in 2003 omitted evidence which
contradicted the hypothesis said weapons were still being developed by the Iraqi
government.
There is no reason to think the evidence for conspiracy theories is more likely
to rely on problematic instances of errant-contradictory data, unless we assume said
theories are rivals to epistemically superior theories. But this would mean that the
worry about contradictory data rests upon the assumption conspiracy theories are
prima facie unwarranted, which we have already seen is a problematic claim. Indeed,
the problem certain conspiracy theorists raise is the possibility conspirators have
introduced fabricated evidence in order to make particular conspiracy theories look
like they rely overly on contradictory data. That is to say, some conspiracy theorists
are worried about what is commonly called ‘disinformation.’
4 Disinformation
The term ‘disinformation’ (from the Russian ‘dezinformatsiya’) was coined by agents
in theUSSR in the late 1930s to portray the claims of theCommission of Inquiry into the
ChargesMade against Leon Trotsky in theMoscowTrials (aka the Dewey Commission)—
that the Moscow Trials were, in fact show trials—as unwarranted. We can deﬁne
‘Disinformation’ as:
Disinformation: The activity of presenting fabricated or manipulated information
to make some explanatory hypothesis look warranted according to the evi-
dence when it might not be.10
The use of disinformation is no idle fancy. The ‘Dodgy Dossier’ which allegedly
justiﬁed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 really was doctored—which is to say fake ‘evi-
dence’ was introduced into it and contradictory evidence omitted—by political op-
erators in the U.K..
10As Sissela Bok deﬁnes it: ‘[A] neologism that stands for the spreading of false information to
hurt adversaries’ (Bok 1982, p. 187).
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Disinformation need not just be the product of institutional corruption or con-
spiracies undertaken by members of inﬂuential institutions. Individuals, for exam-
ple, can disinform others. You might disinform friends about your own activities in
order to ensure they do not know what you have been up to. Or you might spread
disinformation about an enemy in order to ensure your friends do not like them.
Sometimes you will even make it look as if some action of yours was undertaken by
some other group (this is the notion of the ‘false ﬂag,’ which will be discussed in
section 4.3).
People, then, disinform each other all the time, yet we only seem to think this
is extraordinary when conspiracy theorists talk about it. We should ask why that is.
4.1 Counterfacts and Falsiﬁability
Susan Feldman presents an interesting gloss on disinformation, the analysis of which
helps inform our response to claims about contradictory data being allegedly abused
by conspiracy theorists. Looking at what she calls ‘counterfact theories’—a kind
of conspiracy theory which gets its epistemic weight from errant data—Feldman
argues belief in counterfact theories is prima facie irrational (Feldman 2011). Why?
Because explanations which rely on errant data are unfalsiﬁable, and thus irrational
to believe by default.
This point has been made in stricter epistemic terms by Keeley. Unlike Feld-
man, Keeley argues that the apparent unfalsiﬁability of conspiracy theories is not a
problem per se (Keeley 1999).11 After all, if there really is a conspiracy in existence,
then it is not unreasonable to suspect disinformation might be produced to cover it
up.
Not just that, but—as I have argued elsewhere—the production of disinforma-
tion is an auxiliary hypothesis of only some conspiracy theories; it is not a feature of
all of them (Dentith 2014, ch. 8). When a conspiracy theory relies on some claim
about the existence of disinformation in the evidentiary record, that auxiliary hy-
pothesis must be assessed on its own merits. Then, and only then, can its evidential
weight with respect to some conspiracy theory be calculated.
As such, Feldman is wrong to claim that conspiracy theories which suggest the
production of disinformation are automatically irrational to believe. Given that er-
rant data—both contrary and contradictory—can be a feature of any explanation,
we have to assess claims about said data on a case-by-case basis. Assertions that
there is disinformation in the evidentiary record are claims about how the conspir-
ators are engaging in a particular kind of cover-up. Falsifying such a claim does not
mean that there is no conspiracy. Rather, it means that this kind of evidence for
the existence of a conspiracy does not apply in this particular instance.
11This point has also been discussed by both Steve Clarke (Clarke 2002), and (Basham 2011).
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4.2 Probabilities
This leads us to an interesting worry: if you think the government has used disin-
formation in the past, then it is not unreasonable to suspect that they might still be
producing it now.
Our notion of the independent likelihood or the prior probability of any kind
of conspiratorial activity happening here-and-now depends on our beliefs about the
kind of society we think we live in. If you grow up in a culture where deceit and
cover-ups are commonplace, then you will be much more inclined to believe cover-
ups are happening; you will ﬁnd claims about them elsewhere more plausible than
the person who thinks they live in a largely open society.12 Indeed, we could even say
our democratic structures are—in part—the product of people creating institutions
to monitor things they distrusted or found suspicious about their governments, but
it is not obvious that the creation of these institutions has absolved us completely
of those worries.
As such, whilst our notions of how conspired or unconspired our societies are
(that is, whether or not we think conspiracies are common now13) tells us little about
the warrant of any particular, contemporary conspiracy theory, they do inform our
judgements about how likely we think particular kinds of deceptive activities are.
This, in turn, affects our judgements about claims of disinformation, selectiveness
and the like, which then affects our notion of just how probable such activity is
here-and-now.14
The history, then, of past conspiratorial activity cannot be easily swept away. The
principle at stake here is that if we are going to dismiss claims of disinformation and
the like, then we need some argument to the extent we have good reason to think
the past incidence of conspiratorial activity tells us little about the possibility such
activity is occurring here-and-now.
4.3 Fortuitous&FortunateData
Take, for example, false ﬂags. A false ﬂag is an operation run by members of one
political establishment designed to look like it was the actions of some other; the
‘ﬂag’ of the culprits is merely a ruse.
For example, in June of 2016—in the lead up to the U.S. presidential election—it
was revealed that the Democratic National Committee (DNC) had been hacked.
12For further discussion of this, see (Basham 2011) and (Dentith 2016).
13Such judgments will differ from country to country, or culture to culture. Wemight, for example,
suspect Aotearoa (New Zealand) to be a relatively benign polity compared to Romania. As such, New
Zealanders might think of their country as unconspired because whilst conspiracies do occur, they
occur infrequently compared to other nation states.
14For further discussion on prior probabilities and allegations of conspiracy now see (Basham 2011)
and (Dentith 2016).
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The hacker (or hackers), Guccifer 2.0, claimed to be Romanian, but it was widely
believed by national security experts that Guccifer 2.0 was a persona created by
elements of the Russian intelligence service. That is to say, the Russian intelligence
services used the ‘ﬂag’ of Romania to hide the fact they were behind the hack of the
DNC (Franceschi-Bicchierai 2016).15
Now, people were suspicious about the timing of the DNC hack precisely be-
cause it was convenient for the Republican Party candidate, Donald J. Trump, whose
position on Russia was considered soft compared to the Democratic Party candi-
date, Hillary Clinton. That is to say, it was very lucky the DNC but not the Re-
publicans got hacked. Not just that, but the lucky nature of that data appears
suspicious when we consider what occurred next; to wit, the election of a seemingly
pro-Russian, American president. This, then, might be an example of what Joel
Buenting and Jason Taylor call ‘fortuitous data.’ Such data:
i) supports the official story; but
ii) ﬁts the official story too well; is “too good to be true” Finally,
iii) the “lucky” nature of the data is left unexplained by the official
story (Buenting and Taylor 2010, p. 572).
Fortuitous data is purported evidence for a particular theory which is lucky in the
sense the luckiness of the data suggests it has been fabricated or tampered with.
For example, the official (conspiracy) theory about the attack on the Pentagon on
September 11th, 2001, makes reference to a piece of what might be considered for-
tuitous data, the fact American Airlines Flight 77 (AA77) crashed into the only re-
inforced section of the Pentagon. For some, the fortuitous nature of this purported
evidence requires an explanation. That is, the luckiness of the data is suspicious in
such a way to suggest alternative explanations other than pure happenstance.
Yet data which is lucky might just turn out to be fortunate. ‘Fortunate data,’ as
we might term it, is:
Data that:
i) supports some theory, and
ii) is lucky.
15The most remarked upon (and only alleged) false ﬂag operation was the Reichstag Fire of 1933,
which was used by the Chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler, to enable emergency legislation which
suspended civil liberties and allow him to round up the suspected arsonists, the Communists. This
curious and convenient fact has led some to argue that the ﬁre was a false ﬂag event, designed to
bolster the power of the Nazis in the German parliament.
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Fortunate data is merely lucky. That is, it just happens to be the case that chance
swung in such a way to provide evidence which then turned out to support one
particular theory. So, while it is true it was convenient for the official (conspiracy)
theory of 9/11 that Flight AA77 hit the only reinforced part of the Pentagon, it really
was just a matter of luck—that is to say it was fortunate—that this data supports said
theory.
The problem, then, with claims about some piece of purported data being for-
tuitous is that it is hard a priori to distinguish between fortuitous (too lucky to be
true) and fortunate (just lucky) data.
Take, for example, the purported evidence Buenting and Taylor use to motivate
this talk of fortuitous data: the discovery of one of 9/11 hijacker’s passports in the
debris around Ground Zero. They note:
That al-Sugami’s passport survived the impact, ensuing ﬁreball, and
was found eighty ﬂoors below in (surprisingly) pristine condition is lucky.
Moreover, that a passerby should have noticed the passport, attached
signiﬁcance to it, and reported the ﬁnding to an appropriate authority
is fortuitous, particularly given the panic and duress one imagines those
terrifying moments would have been like. All of this evidence suggests
an alternative explanation, besides the explanation offered by the offi-
cial story (Buenting and Taylor 2010, p. 574).
Whilst it is true the survival and discovery of al-Sugami’s passport is fortuitous
(in the sense that the survival of the passport—given the surrounding circumstances—
is very lucky indeed) it is the fact the survival and discovery of the passport supports
the official (conspiracy) theory of 9/11 which speaks to this admittedly unlikely event
being so lucky as to be suspicious (i.e. fortuitous). That is, it is the fact the lucky na-
ture of the data ends up supporting the official (conspiracy) theory but not the (rival)
conspiracy theory that is doing the epistemic work here.
Now, what might demarcate the fortuitous from the fortunate is some claim
about the luckiness of certain patterns of data; i.e. we apply our analysis of prior
probabilities to the evidence at hand. For example, we might take it that the po-
lice now are—all things considered—trustworthy when it comes to presenting ev-
idence of criminal wrongdoing. But if we were looking at a case from the context
of, say, the 1970s—when the planting of evidence and false convictions were more
commonplace—our suspicions about how corrupt the police were then would affect
our suspicions about just how fortunate, or fortuitous some data was with respect to
a particular conviction. This indicates that, if we are going to be able to distinguish
between fortunate and fortuitous data—between data that is lucky and data which
is so-lucky-it’s-not-true—then we need to focus on patterns of data which suggest
the data is suspiciously fortunate.
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The problem is that we cannot principally distinguish between data which is for-
tuitous and data which is merely fortunate without already having made (implicitly
or explicitly) some claim about the likeliness of a conspiracy (i.e. made assumptions
about the pattern of data). As such, just because some data which supports a theory
is lucky, that tells us nothing about whether the data is fortuitous. As such, char-
acterising some piece of evidence for or against a particular conspiracy theory as
either fortunate or fortuitous will tend to rely upon claims about just how likely or
unlikely we think conspiracies are in a given context. As we have seen, those claims
have to be judged on their own merits, and thus the rationality of the principle of
what demarcates the fortunate from the fortuitous in such cases is not prima facie
false or unwarranted. Rather, if we are concerned about the suspicious of certain
evidence when it comes to a theory—conspiracy or otherwise—we need to look at
the wider context of how evidence is used or abused in our epistemic communities.
5 Secret Evidence
Now, not all evidence for or against conspiracy theories is manipulated. Sometimes
it is cited as existing but turns out to not be examinable. That is, some of the evi-
dence is secret.
Secret evidence: Some piece of purported evidence, where the justiﬁcation for
the belief that the information presented is evidence is not just unexpressed
but is stated as being deliberately withheld.
For example, Donald Rumsfeld—among many other members of both the U.S.
and U.K. governments—argued that the pejoratively labelled ‘conspiracy theories’
concerning the real reason for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were unreasonable. Why?
Because the public should trust the evidence provided in secret to the U.S. and U.K.
governments by the CIA and MI6.
Now, if such evidence is not supported with other, non-secret evidence, then we
should remain agnostic about its evidential weight. If the attempted debunking of
any claim—conspiracy theory or otherwise—relies upon secret evidence, then it is
reasonable to treat it with suspicion. Even in cases where the person citing such
secret evidence appears credible and trustworthy, there is always the possibility that
they are acting insincerely, are mistaken, or even have been misled by someone else.
Of course, we might want to admit in some cases of secret evidence. There will
be instances where it is appropriate to hide the source of some evidence to protect
said source. Intelligence agencies from one country might only be willing to share
vital information with foreign powers in cases where they know said intelligence
will not be leaked to the press. Information about governmental malfeasance might
only come to light in cases where the source is assured of anonymity. In other cases
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we might be concerned about portions of the total evidence not being salient to
the issue at hand, so we reserve the right to keep some of the evidence private or
secret. However, in each of these cases a principle can be given as to why secrecy
is necessary, which should—if expressed—reassure people as to why some of the
evidence is being kept secret. In such cases we should also be able to point towards
supporting evidence which is not secret to warrant the claim in question.
However, all this does is push the issue back one step, because the principle
espoused as to why some evidence is being kept secret could be insincere and taken
to be an example of evidence manipulation.
In addition, keeping some evidence secret—say, because of its conﬁdential nature—
might also be convenient. This would especially be the case if said evidence turned
out to be weak but was nonetheless given weight by certain agents. Arguably, this
is one argument as to why Rumsfeld and company believed they had good reason to
invade Iraq; the conﬁdential information they received weakly suggested that Iraq
might still be producing weapons of mass destruction and they treated these claims
are having much more evidential weight than they deserved because it was polit-
ically convenient for them.16 As such, the unexpressed nature of the justiﬁcation
for secret evidence—even in a case of trusting the speaker implicitly—is, at best,
hesitant grounds for accepting the claim.
If there is a problem with secret evidence with respect to conspiracy theories,
then, it is to do with the pattern of secret evidence used in support of such theories.
However, given that secret evidence is found both in (pejoratively labelled) conspir-
acy theories and their rivals (and, arguably, is used more potently by public officials),
we cannot claim the citation of secret evidence is an issue for conspiracy theories
alone.
6 TheWorry About Evidence
What seems tomotivate our scepticism of evidence for conspiracy theories is a scep-
ticism about the existence of conspiracies themselves; we assume they do not hap-
pen, or that they are rare. As a consequence, we introduce a high evidential thresh-
old for conspiracy theories that we do not apply to other theories which use the
same kind of evidence. This has the interesting—and it would seem pathological—
consequence that we judge certain kinds of evidence cited in favour of conspiracy
theories as unlikely or prima facie suspicious, even if the same kinds of evidence are
being used in an attempt to show up said conspiracy theories. We need, then, to
reorient our discussion of how conspiracy theorists use evidence to focus on the
principles behind the citation of such evidence. Not just that, we need to seriously
16It is possible in such a situation that weak evidence is treated as being strong due to effects like
conﬁrmation bias and the like; we do not have to necessarily assume a conspiracy in such cases.
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consider why the same kind of allegedly problematic evidence is routinely used and
abused in non-conspiratorial contexts without any of the opprobrium associated
with conspiracy theories.
However, there are still worries about the way in which we talk about evidence
generally, some of which suggest that our attitude towards evidence when it comes
to conspiracy theories is problematic in a wider sense.
7 Size&Number
Sometimes it is claimed belief in conspiracy theories invokes conspiracies which are
so big—either with respect to how long they have been said to exist, or the number
of people involved—that evidence for the conspiracy should be readily available. As
such, the lack of said evidence is taken to be evidence against it. We might think of
this as some claim like ‘It’s too big to be true!’
Take, for example, the work of Michael Barkun, whose typology of conspira-
cies is often cited as a reason for scepticism of big, all-embracing conspiracy theo-
ries.17 He speciates out claims of conspiracy into three types: ‘event’, ‘systemic’ and
‘superconspiracies’ (Barkun 2003).18 Belief in an event conspiracy can be rational
because they concern a ‘limited, discrete event or set of events …[where] the con-
spiratorial forces are alleged to have focused their energies on a limited, well-deﬁned
objective’ (Barkun 2003, p. 6).19 However, systemic—plots where the conspirators
have a broad goal20—and superconspiracies—plots which combine both event and
systemic conspiracies21—are typically irrational.22 This is in part because, at least
according to Barkun, they are unfalsiﬁable.
We have already addressed the problem with claiming conspiracy theories are
unfalsiﬁable back in section 4.1: claiming a conspiracy theory is unfalsiﬁable due
17Barkun is no sceptic of conspiracies, and he accepts that some conspiracy theories have turned
out to be warranted; here we are simply speaking about one aspect of his work.
18This kind of size criterion can also be found in the work of Juha Räikkä, who distinguishes
between local, global and total conspiracy theories (Räikkä 2009); Martha Lee, who also talks about
superconspiracies (Lee 2011); and Volker Heins, who also makes a similar distinction between types
of conspiracies (Heins 2007).
19This view on the rationality of what Barkun calls ’event conspiracies’ can be found in earlier
works by (C. Pigden 1995), (Keeley 1999), Peter Knight (Knight 2000), and (Basham 2001).
20Such as taking control of a nation state or subverting existing institutions.
21Superconspiracies, citing ever larger conspiracies, cast into doubt any evidence for the conspir-
acy, since the conspirators are considered to be in the position to control and subvert the evidential
record.
22Barkun’s stipulation about the irrationality of belief in systemic and superconspiracies is close in
kind to Popper’s stipulation about the irrationality of belief in what he calls the ‘conspiracy theory
of society,’ (Popper 1969); both Barkun and Popper ascribe to the kind of people who believe in
all-embracing conspiracy theories a kind of mental pathology.
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to the lack of evidence for the conspiracy is an auxiliary hypothesis of only some
conspiracy theories; as noted, said hypothesis must be judged on its own merits on a
case-by-case basis. The fact that some conspiracy theories posit bigger conspiracies
than others is not in itself evidence that said theories are unsustainable; at best
it tells us that the evidential requirements for showing belief in such a conspiracy
might be harder to satisfy (but not necessarily unsatisﬁable).
Using a different line of argumentation, David Robert Grimes presents a math-
ematical model for why conspiracies of a certain size are prone to fail, and thus why
belief in big conspiracy theories is irrational (Grimes 2016). Grimes’ argument cen-
tres around the viability of conspiratorial activity and how our understanding of the
viability of such activity weighs upon considerations of the rationality of belief in
associated conspiracy theories.
Grimes admits conspiracies occur. Indeed, he uses three examples—the NSA’s
Mass Surveillance programme, theTuskegee syphilis experiment, and the FBI foren-
sic scandal—to establish the parameters of what he considers viable conspiratorial ac-
tivity. His viability measure is a function of the time it takes for the existence of a
conspiracy to be leaked, and the number of conspirators involved in the conspiracy.
To establish a best-case scenario for the viability of a conspiracy, Grimes deliber-
ately overestimates the number of conspirators involved in his three examples. This
is because the most generous estimate of the viability of those conspiracies comes
out of assuming that everyone was in on it; 30,000 conspirators in the case of the
NSA, 6,700 in the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, and 500 members of the FBI. He
then makes two key assumptions:
1. Conspirators are generally dedicated to keeping their activity secret, or con-
cealed.
2. Leaks by conspirators expose conspiracies, rendering the conspiracies redun-
dant.
He then assumes that since exposure of a conspiracy via a leak should be a rare
kind of event, two scenarios present themselves to explain why leaks nonetheless
happen:
1. Conspirators must work at maintaining their deception, which means that, as
time passes, a mistake or leak is bound to happen, and relatively quickly.23
2. In the case of a conspiracy which does not need a sustained cover-up, conspir-
ators can try to wait it out, and say nothing, which might fend off exposure
for longer.24
23‘Quickly’ here is measured in ﬁve year chunks.
24Grimes does suggest that as time passes, conspirators are likely to start panicking about potential
exposure, and thus leak regardless.
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There are two kinds of leak in his model: intentional (where a whistleblower or
disgruntled member of the conspiracy leaks information in order to expose it) and
accidental (where a conspirator fails to cover up some facet of their conspiratorial
activity).
Yet the examples Grimes uses do not ﬁt his model of conspiracies failing due
to leaks. Take the NSA example; Grimes portrays Snowden as a conspirator who
leaked information about the existence of PRISM and other related surveillance
programmes. That certainly is one version of that story, but it is important to note
that Snowden’s narrative is that of being a whistleblower: an outsider—rather than a
conspirator—who discovered the existence of the conspiracy.
Then there is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. Information about the experi-
ment was openly published in medical journals; the cover-up, so to speak, was that
the patients were not told about the experiment. Once again, it was outsiders who
then revealed the existence of the conspiracy. For example, Peter Buxton—who is
often considered as the whistleblower in this case—came to know about the exper-
iments because of his job with the United States Public Health Service. He was not
a conspirator but, rather, a worried public official who leaked the information to the
press because his worries were not taken seriously by management.
Finally, there is the case of the FBI Forensic Scandal. The ‘leak’ of the inadequacy
of much of the forensic work undertaken by the FBI at the time did not, once again,
come from a conspirator, but from someone—notably Dr. Frederic Whitehurst—
checking and rechecking work. The fact thatmanagement was not willing to discuss
the matter openly is what precipitated his going public about the issue.
Grimes has it that these conspiracies failed because the conspirators could not
help but leak evidence of their conspiracies. Yet in his examples the conspiracies
were revealed by inquisitive outsiders. There is, then, a mismatch between Grime’s
chosen examples, and his theory about how leaks over time revealed andmade these
conspiracies redundant; his examples fail to capture the very thing he wants to mea-
sure. This is a problem for both his probability estimates and his subsequent pre-
dictions about the putative viability of alleged ongoing conspiracies here-and-now.
As such, Grimes’ claim that big conspiracies are unviable, and thus conspiracy
theories about them are irrational, fails to get off the ground. Yet it is still instructive
to look at how his model would fail to work even if he had captured the right ideas
to start with.
7.1 Conspiracies Now
Grimes wants to use his model to assess four putative conspiracy theories which
posit nefarious and underhanded action by scientists, namely conspiracy theories
about:
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• NASA covering up the truth of what really happened with the Moon-landing
in 1969 (AKA the Moon Landing Hoax),
• Anthropogenic Climate Change,
• Vaccines causing Autism and
• the covering up of Cancer cures.25
In establishing his baseline for the viability of known conspiracies Grimes was
charitable: it made sense to overestimate the number of conspirators because it al-
lowed him to establish a best-case scenario for known, exposed conspiracies. But
in assessing putative conspiracies Grimes overestimates the number of people in-
volved. According to Grimes proponents of the Moon Landing Hoax take it that
everyone in NASA in the late 60s and early 70s was complicit in the cover-up. He has
effectively changed the goalposts; by using total populations—and thus assuming ev-
eryone knows—he skews the analysis by claiming ‘If everyone knew, then someone
should have leaked by now….’
The problem is that Grimes fails to distinguish between claims about the size
of a conspiracy versus its putative structure. Grimes does not distinguish between
kinds of conspirators, let alone conspirators and whistleblowers. A conspiracy can
look big, yet only a small number of people involved in it might know its full extent
or aim. Some members of the conspiracy will be lackeys, goons or even unwitting
conspirators. Not everyone in the NSA need necessarily know that the data they
are collecting and processing has been illegally obtained, and FBI agents who were
using forensic evidence to secure convictions may not have been informed by senior
personnel that the kind of evidence they were relying upon was of dubious merit. It
is even possible to be involved in a conspiracy without realising you are conspiring.26
As such, size really only matters once you take into account the structure of the
purported set of conspirators. Once you take that into account, we encounter the
problem of information hierarchies.
8 Toxic Truths
Lee Basham, in multiple works, discusses such information hierarchies, and intro-
duces the notion of ‘toxicity’ or ‘toxic truth:’ evidence of a conspiracy that no one
25It is useful to note that Grimes labels Moon landing hoax theories as ‘fringe,’ climate change
conspiracy theories as ‘utterly negated by the sheer wealth of evidence against such a proposition’
(Grimes 2016, p. 3), and anti-vaccination beliefs as ‘scare-mongering (Grimes 2016, p. 3).’ As such,
Grimes starts out by assuming that which he wants to prove; these putative conspiracies are unviable.
26For further discussion on this topic, see (Dentith and Orr 2017).
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will touch or disseminate because of feared negative social consequences (Basham
2011).
Take, for example, the following hypothetical. Newly discovered evidence by an
investigative journalist strongly suggests the received narrative about the events of
9/11 is not just wrong, but that members of the press and the government have been
keeping this secret. The journalist approaches her editor, but is told to shelve the
story; the consequences of going to print would be disastrous not just for the paper
(which will be implicated as being part of the cover-up) but also for the government.
If it really could be shown that the years of public discourse surrounding the events
of 9/11 was based on a sustained lie, then the loss of trust in the government could
lead to mass civil unrest and so forth. What she has discovered is toxic, and thus
for the good of the nation state it must be suppressed.
The possibility of toxic truths presents an interesting problem. We cannot nec-
essarily appeal to authority to decide whether the evidence is good, because said
authority might be interested in downplaying the evidence. However, an appeal to
the evidence itself would be just as troubling, because if it is toxic, thenwe should ex-
pect disinformation to be produced about the centrality or salience of said evidence.
Not just that: there will be arguments to the extent that the evidence is the result
of selective tampering in the pool of evidence, or other evidence will be used selec-
tively to show up said toxic truth. Sorting out the evidence from the non-evidence
in a case like this is no trivial task.
8.1 The Polite Society
One reply would be to say that the non-reporting of such evidence might just be be-
cause it has been politely ignored or downplayed by the populace. By ‘polite’ wemean
here something like ‘It is just not talked about:’ some seemingly toxic truths might
just be the polite ﬁctions we employ to ensure the smooth running of our society.
Toxic truths, after all, imply a cover-up which is top-down: journalists; politicians;
the judiciary; and the police conspire to stop certain truths escaping into or infect-
ing the polity. Politeness, however, suggests that sometimes we engage in ‘cover-
ups’ (so to speak) from the bottom-up by ignoring certain problems or patterns of
behaviour in our societies. So, for example, many citizens of the 1970s knew the po-
lice were planting evidence to secure convictions, but ignored the situation because
they trusted that the police were targeting the right kind of people.
Politeness and toxicity are all a matter of degree and context; some things are
politely ignored27 and some things are kept secret because letting the public learn
27For example, institutionalised racism and sexism, historically, has been brought to the public’s
attention but not acted upon/been politely ignored. For the victims of such discrimination, at least,
this can look very much like a society trying to cover things up and act as if everything is normal.
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the truth about them would be damaging.28
Politeness—in the sense discussed here—is a complimentary thesis to toxicity.
Both analyses—toxicity and politeness—can be true at once in a given society; some
evidence might be politely ignored by the populace and some of it might be so toxic
as to require an active cover-up. After all, in defence of an analysis through the lens
of toxicity, it is hard to dispute that our society is more conspired than we think.29.
Sometimes politeness will be used an excuse for not revealing evidence which turns
out to be toxic. After all, what better way to shut down a story than by telling
a journalist ‘Don’t bother reporting that; everybody knows, but no one cares about
it!’ Claiming some terrible crime will be politely ignored is just another way to cover
it up.
The principle behind both toxicity and politeness is secure; there are certain
truths about society which might be considered unspeakable, whether that be by
edict fromon high or by popularity. We cannot expect that evidence of a conspiracy—
or indeed any kind of wrongdoing—will be automatically the subject of popular op-
probrium. Indeed, given the continuing tendency to downplay the seriousness of
sexual assault, the unwillingness by governments to acknowledge—let alone address—
shocking inequalities in our societies, this shows that a certain amount of politeness
or aversion to toxicity is still a factor in society today; we do not need to talk about
conspiracies or conspiracy theories to illustrate that.30
9 Conclusion
When looking at how evidence gets used both in the support and condemnation
of conspiracy theories, it turns out we cannot justify the claim conspiracy theorists
have lax evidential standards compared to the rest of us. Indeed, the kinds of evi-
dence cited in support of conspiracy theories are also routinely found and cited in
support in theories which are not considered conspiratorial. It is interesting that
we do not typically ﬁnd such evidence or evidential practices to be problematic in
those cases; we seem to have introduced a high evidential threshold for conspiracy
theories that we do not typically apply to other theories.
Yet when we consider the principles behind the seemingly suspicious kinds of
evidence associated with conspiracy theories, we ﬁnd that the evidentiary practices
28This, at least, was the rationale behind the cover-up of the ‘Unfortunate Experiment’ in Aotearoa
(New Zealand), where women who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer were not informed that
they were taking part in a clinical trial and being deliberately under-treated. The whistleblowers were
ignored by the authorities because to act upon that information would have lead to a loss of trust by
the public in the medical profession.
29As previously mentioned, see (Dentith 2016).
30Indeed, many of the activities we suspect ground our belief in the existence of conspiracies are
open secrets, some of which we just politely ignore, or downplay (see (Dentith and Orr 2017)).
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of the conspiracy theorist are not necessarily fallacious. None of this is to say that
conspiracy theorists are exemplary reasoners; no one denies that there is spurious
or fallacious belief in some conspiracy theories. However, if we are to investigate
belief in conspiracy theories, we cannot start from a position of assuming conspiracy
theorists are automatically at fault when it comes to evidential concerns. That—as
we have seen—goes against the (available) evidence.
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